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District Court No. 910907736 PI
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Defendant and Appellee.

Priority No. 15

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
A.

Issues on Appeal

Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of

law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting
sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of
material fact that remains for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
B.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of

law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable inference could be made
by a jury that Albertsons created the condition which allegedly
caused Chaffin's fall.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Lindsay v. Eccles

Hotel Co.. 248 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431

P.2d 566 (Utah 1967); Silcox v. Skacrcrs-Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d
623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
C.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of

law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting
sufficient evidence that Albertsons had actual or constructive
notice of the condition allegedly causing Chaffin1s fall and a
reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after having notice.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d
1139 (Utah 1977).
II.
The

Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Ruling
appellate

court

reviews

for

correctness

the

legal

conclusions of the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97
(Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

STATUTES,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b)(c) and (e) , attached in
addendum as Exhibit "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall of
Chaffin inside a grocery store operated by Albertsons on the
morning of January 3, 1991 at 7:05 a.m. (R. 2-5).

The subject

grocery store is located in Taylorsville, Utah, at 1825 West 4700
South. (Id.)
2

II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
Chaffin filed her Complaint on or about December 11, 1991, and

Albertsons filed an Answer on or about December 30, 1991.

(R. 2

and 11). On or about May 5, 1993, Albertsons filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against all causes of action asserted by Chaffin.
(R. 66). A hearing on Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment was
held before the trial court on May 23, 1993, at which time the
court denied the Motion without prejudice and invited Albertsons to
renew

its

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

completion date of September 30, 1993.

after

the

discovery

(R. 223-234).

The trial

court represented at the hearing that it wanted to give Chaffin
every opportunity it could to discover "any additional evidence as
to facts which would demonstrate that this case should go to the
jury . . . ."

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary

Judgment at 10-11, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "B"; R. 280281) .
After the completion of discovery, Albertsons renewed its
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about October 8, 1993. (R. 240) .
A hearing on the Motion was held before the trial court on November
5, 1993.

(R. 243). After reading the Motion for Summary Judgment

and Memoranda in support thereof, and the Memorandum in Opposition
thereto, and after hearing argument of counsel for both Chaffin and
Albertsons, the trial court granted Albertsons1 Motion for Summary
3

Judgment.

(Order Granting Summary Judgment, attached in Addendum

as Exhibit "C"; R. 246-248) The Honorable Richard H. Moffat signed
the Order granting summary judgment and dismissing all causes of
action against Albertsons on November 15, 1993.

(Id.).

STATEMENT OP PACTS
1.

This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall

of Chaffin in a grocery store operated by Albertsons which is
located in Taylorsville, Utah. (Complaint 5 3-5; R. 2-3).
2.
Albertsons

On or about January 3, 1991, Chaffin entered the subject
store intending to purchase a few grocery items.

(Deposition of Chaffin at 5, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "D";
R. 372) . After selecting a few grocery items in various areas of
the store, Chaffin was walking along the back aisle of the store
proceeding east toward the dairy section to pick up a carton of
milk. (Id. at 12-13, Exhibit "D"; R. 379-380; Chaffin1s Diagram of
Sales Floor, attached in addendum as Exhibit

"E"; R. 455).

Chaffin was walking in the middle of the aisle next to the meat and
seafood counter when she saw a floor cleaning machine come out from
an aisle of groceries ahead of where she was walking.

(Deposition

of Chaffin at 11-17, Exhibit "D"; R. 378-384; Chaffin's Diagram,
Exhibit "E"; R. 455). Chaffin observed the cleaning machine, with
its operator, come out from the grocery aisle, circle around the
end of the display rack, and head down the next aisle over.
4

(Id.) .

3.

At the same time Chaff in noticed the cleaning machine

coming out from the aisle, she claims that she slipped and fell to
the floor (Id.).

Chaffin testified that she noticed the cleaning

machine at the same time both feet went out from underneath her.
(Id.) Chaffin estimated that the cleaning machine was one aisle of
groceries ahead of her, approximately 10 feet away, at the time she
noticed it.

(Id.).

The fall occurred at approximately 7:05 a.m.

on the morning of January 3, 1991.

(Complaint 5 3; R. 2; Customer

Slip and Fall Form; R. 102).
4.

Chaffin testified that a wet spot of water on the floor

caused her to fall.

(Deposition of Chaffin at 12-13, Exhibit "D";

R. 379-380). Chaffin did not see the wet spot before she fell, but
claims she noticed it for the first time when she stood up.

(Id.

at 23, Exhibit "D"; R. 390). Chaffin described the wetness as a
circular spot of water approximately one foot in diameter.
22-23, Exhibit "D"; R. 389-390).

(Id. at

Chaffin testified that there was

no other wetness around that spot and that she didn't notice any
other wetness in that area on the back aisle.
Exhibit "D"; R. 390-391).

(Id. at 23-24,

Chaffin testified that she did not see

wetness or suds anywhere else on the sales floor on the day of the
fall.

(Id. at 81, Exhibit "D"; R. 448).
5.

Chaffin did not see the cleaning machine clean the area

of floor where she fell. (Id. at 16, Exhibit "D"; R. 383; Chaffin1 s
5

Diagram, Exhibit "E"; R. 455). Chaffin testified that she didn't
know how the spot of water which allegedly caused her fall arrived
on the floor.

(Deposition of Chaffin at 25, Exhibit "D"; R. 392).

She further testified that she did not know how long the spot of
water had been on the floor before her fall. (Id.).
6.

Allen Morley was the independent custodian who was

operating the cleaning machine on the morning of January 3, 1991.
(Deposition of Allen Morley at 7-10, attached in Addendum as
Exhibit "F"; R. 304-307). Morley owned his own janitorial business
called Morley Janitorial Service which contracted with Albertsons
to clean the floor of the Taylorsville store and other Albertsons
store locations. (Id.).
7.

Allen

Morley

testified

in his

deposition

that the

cleaning machine would operate by laying down a water and soap
solution on the floor and then pads on the machine would scrub the
solution into the floor. (Id. at 12, Exhibit "F"; R. 309). The
operator of the cleaning machine would stand behind the machine and
guide it as it cleaned the floor. (Id. at 13, Exhibit "F"; R. 310).
Any remaining water and solution would then be removed from the
floor by a curved squeegee that would swivel and drag on the floor
under the machine collecting the water or solution and then a
vacuum would suck up any remaining water and soap from the floor.
(Id. at 12-17, Exhibit "F"; R. 309-314).
6

8.

Allen Morley testified that the cleaning machine was new

at the time of the slip and fall occurrence. (Id.) . Albertsons had
purchased

the machine

in the month

occurrence in January, 1991.

(Id.).

of November

before

the

Morley testified that the

squeegee and vacuum were in excellent working condition at the time
of the occurrence.

(Id.)

Allen Morley further testified that,

after cleaning the floor, the cleaning machine left no spots or
even traces of water on the floor.

(Id.). The squeegee and vacuum

removed all wetness or solution from the floor after the floor was
scrubbed. (Id.).
9.

At the time of the accident, Morley was operating the

cleaning machine and walking down aisle 9 toward the meat and
seafood departments on the back aisle. (Id. at 24-32, Exhibit "F";
R. 321-329; Letter from Allen Morley to Stephen G. Morgan, attached
in Addendum as Exhibit "G"; R. 361-364; Morley1s Diagram, attached
in Addendum as Exhibit "H"; R. 365) . As Morley came to the end of
the aisle, he looked to his right and saw Chaff in two or three
aisles away in the middle of the back aisle.

(Id.).

Morley then

proceeded with the cleaning machine around the end of the display
case separating aisles 8 and 9, and guided the cleaning machine
down aisle 8.

(Id.). Morley was approximately 1/4 of the distance

down aisle 8 when he heard a scream.

7

(Id.) . Morley then left the

cleaning machine and went back to the back aisle and observed
Chaffin sitting on the floor in the back aisle.
10.

(Id.)*

Morley approached Chaffin and helped her to her feet and

picked up her groceries.

(Id.).

Morley estimated that the back

aisle was approximately 12 to 14 feet wide, and that Chaffin was
seated in the middle of the aisle a distance of 7 feet from the
aisles to the north and the same distance from the meat and seafood
counter to the south. (Id.)»

Morley estimated that the cleaning

machine was approximately 3 feet wide (Id.).
11.

When Allen Morley went to assist Chaffin, he did not see

any water on the floor in the area where she fell and he did not
observe any water on her clothing.
331-332).

(Id. at 34-35, Exhibit "F"; R.

In addition, Morley testified that he specifically

remembers guiding the cleaning machine around the display case
separating aisles 8 and 9 and that the machine did not leave water
or solution on the floor at that time.

(Id.).

If the cleaning

machine did leave water or solution on the floor, Morley would have
noticed it because he walked behind the cleaning machine to guide
it. (Id. at 12-17, Exhibit "F"; R. 309-314).
12.

Allen Morley further testified that he normally runs the

cleaning machine on the outside aisles of the store, including the
back aisle, before cleaning the inside aisles and that he followed
this same practice on the morning of the occurrence.
8

(Id. at 44-

46, Exhibit "F"; R. 341-343).

Following this practice, Morley

testified that he ran the cleaning machine across the spot where
Chaff in fell 1 hour to 1 1/2 hours before the fall occurred.
(Id.).
13.

Albertsons' Meat Department Manager, Kurt Treasure, was

positioned in front of the meat case when he observed Chaffin on
the floor in the back aisle.
95).

(Affidavit of Kurt Treasure f 4-6; R.

After the fall, Treasure immediately went to Chaffin and

asked if he could help.

(Id.).

He inspected the floor upon

arriving at the scene of the alleged fall and observed the floor to
be completely dry.
14.

(Id. 5 7; R. 95).

At the time of the slip and fall occurrence, Kurt

Treasure's practice, as part of his job as Meat Department Manager,
was to regularly inspect the floor on the back aisle in front of
the meat and seafood counter to see that the area was clear of any
foreign substance.

(Id. 5 8, R. 95). Treasure inspected the floor

in the area of Chaffin1 s alleged fall 10 to 15 minutes before
seeing Chaffin on the floor and did not observe any water or other
foreign debris on the floor at that time.

(Id. 5 9; R. 95-96).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.A.

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that

business owners are not insurers of the safety of their patrons,
which means that they cannot be held liable for every accident that
9

occurs on their premises.

Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d

182 (Utah 1991); Martin v. Safewav Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1977) .

A business owner only has "a duty to use ordinary

care and diligence to protect patrons . . . ."

Gustaveson v.

Gregg. 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982).
The Utah appellate courts have not wavered from holding that
in order to make out a prima facie case of negligence against a
business owner for an injury caused by a temporary condition, a
plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that defendant
had actual or constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable
opportunity to remedy the condition after having notice.

Lindsay

v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Silcox v. SkaggsAlpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any evidence
that Albertsons had notice of the spot of water on the floor
allegedly causing Chaffinfs fall or a reasonable opportunity to
remedy the condition. Therefore, under the applicable law, Chaffin
failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against
Albertsons and, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed
Chaffin's complaint.
I.B.

In advancing her appeal, Chaf fin argues that she need

not prove notice in order to make out a prima facie case of
negligence

against

Albertsons
10

because

there

is

sufficient

circumstantial evidence on which a reasonable inference can be made
by a jury that Albertsons created the dangerous condition. Chaffin
assumes that because she saw a floor cleaning machine several feet
ahead of where she was walking at the time of her fall that the
machine must have left the spot of water on the floor before her
fall.
The undisputed evidence is that the floor cleaning machine did
not leave water or soap on the floor after cleaning the floor.
Allen Morley, the independent janitor who was operating the
cleaning machine at the time of the occurrence, testified in his
deposition that the cleaning machine was new and that the squeegee
and vacuum system used to clean the soap and water from the floor
were in excellent working condition.

Morley testified that the

cleaning machine did not leave any spots or traces of water behind
after cleaning the floor.
Morley further testified in his deposition that he inspected
the floor in the area of the fall immediately after it occurred and
did not see any water or soap solution on the floor. In addition,
Albertsons1 meat department manager, Kurt Treasure, went to assist
Chaffin after the fall and inspected the floor where she fell.
Treasure observed that the floor was completely dry. Treasure also
inspected the floor in the area where Chaffin fell 10 to 15 minutes

11

before the fall and observed the floor at that time to be free from
wetness.
The evidence further shows that Morley ran the floor cleaning
machine across the spot where Chaffin fell 1 to 1 1/2 hours before
the fall occurred.

Chaffin herself testified that she did not see

the floor cleaning machine clean the spot where she fell.

Chaffin

further testified that she did not know how the water arrived on
the floor or how long it had been there before her fall.
Consequently, Chaffin1s only evidence that Albertsons was
responsible for the condition on the floor is her deposition
testimony that she saw a cleaning machine several feet away from
her at the time she fell and that she observed a wet spot on the
floor after getting up from her fall. Based on the evidence in the
record, a reasonable inference cannot be made that Albertsons
created the condition which allegedly caused Chaffin1s fall.
The law provides that a plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
and fair inferences which tend to prove her case. Koer v. Mavfair
Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) . A plaintiff cannot make out his
or her case through conjectural or speculative assertions that lack
an evidentiary foundation.

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697

P.2d 240 (Utah 1985); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983);
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co. , 239 Utah Adv. R. 57 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) .

Chaffin1s allegations that the floor cleaning machine
12

deposited the water on the floor are based on conjecture and are
without

a

proper

evidentiary

foundation.

The

trial

court

appropriately found that there was insufficient evidence for the
jury to draw an inference that the cleaning machine left the water
on the floor and that it could not permit the jury to speculate.
Chaff in described the spot of water which allegedly caused her
to fall as circular and one foot in diameter.

Chaff in further

testified that there was no other wetness around that spot of water
and that she didn't notice water spots anywhere else in the store
that day.

If in fact there was water on the floor as Chaff in

alleges, the water could have arrived on the floor by numerous
possible means without notice to Albertsons.

Chaffin herself

testified that she did not know how the water arrived on the floor
or how long it had been there before her fall.

The trial court

properly granted summary judgment; otherwise, a jury would be left
to impermissibly speculate as to the cause of the water on the
floor.
Chaffin has failed to satisfy her burden of presenting
sufficient evidence showing that Albertson created the condition or
that it had notice of its presence. Accordingly, the trial court
appropriately dismissed Chaffin1s complaint against Albertsons.
II.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that summary judgment is appropriate if a party fails to set forth
13

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue remaining for
trial. Appellate Courts hold that in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the defending party must present sufficient
evidence on which a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's
position will be insufficient. Id. If the non-moving party cannot
muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on
his or her claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Id.

Albertsons supported its Motion for Summary Judgment with
undisputed facts from the record that it did not create the alleged
condition supposedly causing Chaffin's fall and that it did not
have notice of any condition.

Chaffin opposed Albertsons' Motion

by citing to Chaffin's deposition testimony that she observed a
floor cleaning machine before she fell and a spot of water on the
floor. This evidence is simply inadequate to overcome Albertsons'
Motion under Rule 56(e).

A fair minded jury could not find by a

preponderance of the evidence that Chaffin is entitled to a verdict
against Albertsons.

Application of this standard to the instant

case shows that the trial court appropriately granted summary

14

judgment In favor of Albertsons and its order should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
CHAITJM FAILS TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATING THAT ALBERTSONS CREATED THE
CONDITION
ALLEGEDLY
CAUSING
HER FALL;
THEREFORE, CHAFFIN MUST SHOW THAT ALBERTSONS
HAD NOTICE OF THE SUBSTANCE AND A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY THE CONDITION
Chaffin must prove that Albertsons had notice of the condition
and a reasonable opportunity to remedy i t i n o r d e r t ~ - ? * - • — " * •
a prima facie case of negligence
ah is clear wi th respect to the duty of care owed
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t o he IK? bill

liable

t o r .i

condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery, wet substance
on the floor, two conditions must be satisfied: "(A) that he had
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such
knowledge,

sufficient

time

elapsed

that

in

reasonable care he should have remedied it."

the

exercise of

Lindsay v. Eccles

Hotel Co,. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431
P.2d 566 (Utah 1967); Howard v. Auerbach Co,. 437 P.2d 895 (Utah
1968); Long v. Smiths Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973);
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P. 2d 175 (Utah 1975);
Martin, 565 P.2d 1139; Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 746 P.2d 1191
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Silcox v. Skaggs-Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d
623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d
1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The plaintiff has the burden of presenting evidence showing
that the above prerequisites are satisfied in order to make out a
prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.

Id.

Utah

appellate courts have upheld the trial courts' granting of summary
judgment motions and motions for directed verdicts on numerous
occasions where plaintiff

fails to produce adequate evidence

proving notice and a reasonable opportunity to remedy.
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Id.

li: 1 the instant case:*, the record i s devoi d of any evidence

floor supposedly causing Chaffin's fall or a reasonable opportunity
t ::: • J : emedy the cond :i ti 01 :i

Therefore, under the applicable law,

Chaffin failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against
A ] bertsons and the trial court properly ruled that her complaint
shoi ill! d 1: = ::i :i sm i ss ad a ,,s a ma t tiei: o f ,3! e ,i i ,
Chaffin failed to present sufficient evidence that Albertsons
created the condition allegedly causing her fall
In bringing this appeal, Chaf fin arqiies that she need not
prove the notice requirements in order to makes, out a prima facie.
casi

i i I in 11 I mi i J i»™ it r i> in jd i mi1.1 I'llbei't lulls 1 u MI HIM.' I limi'ii

t li.it A l b e r t s o n s c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n
I m|, x e £ Q £ A p p e l l a n t a t 1 h) .

i

i " idi'iire

that caused the accident,

A s |»r cvions.1 y d i s c u s s e d , the general

rule is thai a pla J ntil 1 must pi induce r»v JileJice t:l la t the busli less
owner had notice of the dangerous condition i i :i order to submit the
case II i i | II in ',' ill I I in i mention ef negligence.

The exception to

I In i, general ink" u» that a plaintiil need not prove not Lee ot the
i "niid Ltion if ii was created by the* business ownc
i } '1(|

r,:M

;

, M II'II

LyjKh "" 'l i i" «1l,i ' '•

If a plaintiff is attempting to avrti'^ +"*e notice, requirements
by arguing that the store, owner was responsible for the dangerous
cond ii t:::i DI it, p] a ii i it ti f111: 1 las

I In

I mnliMi

I

| w n d n c i i ig

si iffi ci ent

evidence showing that the business owner created the condition.
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Id,

A plaintiff is entitled to all "reasonable" and "fair"

inferences which tend to prove plaintiff's case. Mavfair Markets,
431 P. 2d 566; Allen, 538 P. 2d 175. A plaintiff is not entitled to
inferences based on conjecture which are not supported by evidence
in the record.

Id.1 A jury is not permitted to speculate that the

defendant is negligent.

Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566; Lindsay,

284 P.2d 477; Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah
1985).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "bare allegations of
negligence unsupported by any facts are not sufficient to withstand
a motion for summary judgment."
(Utah 1990).
assertion

that

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415

The Utah Supreme Court further held: "The mere
an

issue

of

facts

exists

without

a

proper

evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion."

Webster v.

Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) .2
1

See Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 238 Utah Adv. R. 57, 58
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (to meet their burden of proof, the plaintiffs
must provide sufficient evidence raising a reasonable inference
from which the jury may rationally determine that plaintiff's
injuries resulted from the product's defect. "It is not enough to
merely contend that a defect existed, show that an accident
occurred, and assume the two are necessarily related.").
2

See Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989)(,nbare contentions, unsupported by any specification
of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as
will preclude entry of summary judgment.'")(quoting Massev v. Utah
Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980)).
18

Chaf f:i n

e xg iles

:i :i: i

t::l:i:i s

appeal

that

there

is

sufficient

circumstantial evidence on which a reasonable inference can be made
by a jury that the floor cleaning machi ne

ot Appellant at
record

of

. •

6-1 6) .

this

case

Contrary
shows

deposited the spot of

to Chaf fin's

that

Chaff i n's

contentions,

the

allegations

are

:i * Ei: a i id a r = it 10 t si lppor t e d 1: y e\ i dei IC =s :i i 1 t:l: l e r • s c o r d .
I I mi ni ni a r g u e s

i nf e r e n c e t h a t

Mill

11

a i s t h e independent

man Mine

I llii ||iii ; I t i o n

nil

tl le

facts

Moriey

creates

a s p o t o f wa t e r

an

01 :i t h e

(Brief of A p p e l l a n t a t 1 0 - 1 2 ) .
c u s t o d i a n who was o p e r a t i n g t h e

a t t h e I. Line u i t h e s i i p

i t Alien

which

i . HI j machi i le i l s e d a s o a p ai id wa t e r

in t h e c l e a n i n g p r o c o n c ,

All III in Moriey
cleaning

one

t h e c l e a n i nq machi ne ] e f t

J i it i i . I i in i
solution

that

and f a l l

at 7-10, Exhibit

occurrence.

"F"; R

30 1 307) .

Il I ill IN! 11 I i'V ill i ill 1 ill | n il t <>st i if"^| I In it, t tl ie i ::il eai :i i i i ::j mach i i le o p e r a tied
lb), laying down a watei and soap solution oi i the f] oor which would
be scrubbed into the floor by pad,*..; on the cleaning machine. (Id.
ni I

II

III Hi ni Hi in I

I "

II

M*I ni

i d a f I :i i: I fa ii ] s !:: :> p o i i l t: • :: i i t j 1 I :> w e v e r ,

the undisputed evidence in the record that the cleaning machine did
not leave any spots or traces of water behind after cleaning ai i
ai

LMI

n i l II II

1 II

i | ill

i l l II

III" x:l: i I >. i I

III

1' 11? '•., " I Ii:

2 : 9 311 I )

1 1 1•

Moriey testified as follows starting on page 12 of his deposition:
IIJ
i
n understand that you, operated a cleaning
machine as part of your duties; i s that correct?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Could you describe that cleaning machine?

A. Big, awkward and green. Held water and soap solution
in a tank, you would lay it down, pads would scrub the floor
and the vacuum would pick all the water back up.

Q.

Tell me, was the soap and water then picked up from

off the floor?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How?

A.

There's a squeegee that drags behind you.

Q.

Drags behind what?

A.
Behind the machine, and there's a vacuum that's
picking it up as the machine is operating, cleaning the floor.
A. It was a brand new machine. It picked up all the
water off the floor. That's all it took.

Q. Did this machine that was used in the Taylorsville
store that you operated, did it leave these stripes you're
talking about?
A.

It left none.

Q.

It left no water at all?

A.

No.

Q. During the time that you operated that machine you
did not observe that machine to leave water on the floor?
A.

No
20

'if,), s o w h e i i y ou would take the machine around corners,
when you had to turn the machine, would i t leave water 01 1
those occasions?
ft N :::>
I .i ke I r i sntioned, the squeegee is Independent
and it would swivel and tin ack you, so I t won] d pick up all the
water.

the

any w a t e r would yo;u n o t i c e

0,,
IIJ ±1 xL liLti.1 l e t t
floor?
A.

Oh, y e s ,

i t on

definitely.

(id.).

Tn addition,

Albertsons's

meat

department

mmiqnr

Kurt

Treasure,, was on the scene of Chaffin's alleged fall immediately
11 I i I
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Morley further testified in his deposition that he inspected
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floor when it was cleaning the aisles at the time of Chaffin's
fall:
Q. At the time when the cleaning machine rounded the
freezer aisle did you see whether or not it had left any water
or soap on the floor?
A.

None.

Q.

It did not leave any water or soap on the floor?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you specifically remember that?

A.

Yes.

Q. Do you know of any other reason why any water or soap
or anything of that sort would have been on the floor in the
area where she fell?
A. To the best of my knowledge, there was nothing there,
the floor was dry.
(Id. at 35, Exhibit "F", R. 332).
Although the evidence does show that the cleaning machine used
a soap and water solution, the evidence is clear that the machine
did not leave water or any solution on the floor in the area of the
fall.

Chaff in admitted in her deposition that at no time before

her fall did she see the cleaning machine clean the area of floor
where she fell.

(Deposition of Chaffin at 10-11 and 16, Exhibit

"D"; R. 377, 378 and 383).

Chaffin further admitted in her

deposition that she had no knowledge as to how the wetness which
allegedly caused her fall arrived on the floor or for what period
of time it had been there prior to her alleged fall:
22

U, Do ^ ou know II m« tlie water, the spot of water which
you mentioned, i it used your fa IJ , do you know how It arrived on
the floor?
A

II! I

MI
IN it you have personal knowledge as to how long it had
been on the floor before your tall?
k
(Id.

at
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supported
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I he-

c l e a n i n g machine p a s s by t h e spot where she f e l l :
l e t me ask you t o p l a c e an X a t t h e e x a c t
l o c a t i o n when' you f e l l .
A. Right . • . .

Q
You d idn't see the cleaning machine, though, until it
was approximately six to ten feet from where you were?
I , Right.
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Q.

You did not actually see it go over that spot?

A.

No,

(Deposition of Chaffin at 10-11 and 16, Exhibit "D"; R. 377, 378
and 383; Chaffin's Diagram, Exhibit "E"; R. 455).
Chaffin testified that she was walking down the middle of the
back aisle of the store before the fall occurred.

(Deposition of

Chaffin at 11, Exhibit "D"; R. 378; Chaffin1s Diagram, Exhibit "E";
R. 455). Allen Morley testified consistent with Chaffin when he
said that she was located in the middle of the back aisle when he
saw her on the floor.

(Deposition of Allen Morley at 24-32,

Exhibit "F"; R. 321-329; Morley Diagram, Exhibit "H"; R. 365).
Morley estimated that the back aisle was 12 to 14 feet wide and
that Chaffin was positioned a distance of 7 feet from the meat and
seafood counter on the south and the same distance from the grocery
aisles on the north.

(Id.).

Morley testified that he normally runs the cleaning machine on
the outside aisles of the store, including the back aisle, before
cleaning the inside aisles and that he followed this same practice
on the morning of the occurrence.
341-343).

(Id. at 44-46, Exhibit "F"; R.

Following this practice, Morley testified that he ran

the cleaning machine across the spot where Chaffin fell 1 to 1 1/2
hours before the fall occurred. (Id.).
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Contrary to Chaffin's assertions, the direct evidence of this
case is that the location where Chaffin fell was not cleaned
immediately before her fall. Chaffin did not see the machine clean
the spot where she fell and any assertions by her that the cleaning
machine cleaned that spot just before the fall are speculative and
not based on the evidence.
Chaffin further argues in her brief that the wetness on the
floor was one similar to that encountered after mopping a floor,
and that this is another fact creating an inference that the
cleaning machine caused the water to be on the floor.
Appellant at 10-12).

(Brief of

When asked in her deposition to describe the

wetness on the floor, Chaffin initially testified that there were
little spots all over the floor.
Exhibit "D"; R. 389).

(Deposition of Chaffin at 22,

When pressed on the question, however,

Chaffin admitted that there was just one circular spot on the floor
approximately 1 foot in diameter.
389-390).

(Id. at 22-23, Exhibit "D"; R.

Chaffin then testified that there was no other wetness

around that spot of water and that she didn't notice any other
wetness in that area on the back aisle.
R. 390-391).

(Id. 23-24, Exhibit "D";

Chaffin further testified that she did not see any

other wetness or suds on the floor anywhere else in the store that
day.

(Id. at 81, Exhibit "D"; R. 448).
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As previously mentioned, Kurt Treasure, the Meat Department
Manager, inspected the back aisle and did not see any water on the
floor in the back aisle at the time of the fall.
Kurt Treasure f 7-9; R. 95-96).

(Affidavit of

In addition, Morley himself did

not see any water on the back aisle at the time of the fall.
(Deposition of Allen Morley at 34-35, Exhibit "F"; R. 331-332).
The spot of water on the floor described by Chaffin is not
exclusively descriptive of water that is caused by mopping.

The

spot of moisture described by Chaffin (circular and 1 foot in
diameter) could come from any number of possible sources including
a customer spilling water, soda pop, another product, or even
moisture coming from the shoe of a customer. Speculation as to the
source

of

the

wetness

is,

however,

impermissible,

and

is

insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)
Based on the record of this case, a reasonable inference
cannot

be

made

that Albertsons

allegedly caused Chaffin1s fall.

created

the

condition which

Chaffin1s only evidence that

Albertsons was responsible for the wetness on the floor is her
assertion that she saw a cleaning machine one grocery aisle away
from her at the time she fell and that there was a spot of water on
the floor. Chaffin has no other evidence linking Albertsons to the
presence of the wetness on the floor.
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As the Utah Supreme Court

stated: "such a tenuous inference is not one which a jury can be
allowed to make."

Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d at 569.

This is

especially true when considering the undisputed evidence that the
cleaning machine did not cause the wetness to be on the floor and
there was no other wetness anywhere else in the store.
In arriving at its decision to grant Albertsons' Motion for
Summary Judgment, the trial court appropriately found that there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to draw an inference that
the cleaning machine left the water on the floor and that it could
not permit the jury to speculate:
THE COURT: Well, the only—the only basis on which
you could make that decision or that a jury could make
that decision would be the inference that when it went
over it an hour earlier, it left it wet enough that it
remained wet, wet enough for an hour, that when the
plaintiff fell, it was still wet; but when she got up and
walked to the front of the store and got back, it had
dried out.
I think, Mr. Hadley, that is really stretching that
testimony. I think the motion for summary judgment's
well taken. I'm going to grant it.

THE COURT: . . . .
I think there's got to be a
closer tie than an hour from a machine that has been
testified wipes it dry as it cleans it up. And the
condition that your client described would almost infer
that the mop, had it been a mop situation, had just gone
across that. And there's no evidence anywhere, anywhere,
that that bucket and mop had ever been used on that aisle
that evening. There isn't any evidence anywhere about
that.

27

So, all you can worry about—or—or the only thing
you can be concerned about, I think, as far as the
evidence is concerned, is—is the machine. And I just
think that that's speculation and that leap is too far.
I don't think the jury can be allowed to do that.
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment at 23-25,
Exhibit "B"; R. 293-295).
Chaffin cites Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P. 2d 623,
in support of her position. The plaintiff in Silcox brought action
against the defendant grocery store for injuries sustained when she
slipped on the sales floor of defendant's store. The record of the
case showed that the floor was wet where plaintiff fell and spots
of water were found leading to a cart with bags of ice that were
continuing to melt to the floor.

Id. at 624. The record further

showed that the cart was of the type that was only used by store
employees.

Id.

Based on the evidence that there was water on the floor, and
water spots leading to bags of melting ice on a cart only used by
store employees, the court in Silcox determined that a reasonable
inference could be made by the jury that the store created the
condition.

Id. at 624-25.

The facts of Silcox are far removed

from those of the instant case where Chaffin's only evidence that
Albertsons created the wetness on the floor is that before she fell
she observed a cleaning machine several feet away from her and a
spot of water after she fell.

There were no trails of water
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leading to the cleaning machine and there is no evidence that the
cleaning machine left water on the floor.
The facts here are much more closely aligned with Lindsay v.
Eccles Hotel Company. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955).

In Lindsay, the

plaintiff brought action against the defendant after she slipped on
a puddle of water that was on the floor of defendant's coffee shop.
The Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that
because the waitress delivered water to plaintiff in a glass, a
reasonable inference could be made that the waitress spilled the
water on the floor.

The Court stated:

There is no evidence as to whether the waitress, the
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons or persons
spilled the water on the floor, or exactly when it was
spilled or whether the management knew of its existence.
In other words, there was no evidence as to how the water
got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly
when it arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge
of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot
be permitted to speculate that the defendant was negligent.
Id. at 478.
The evidence

for

finding

in favor of Albertsons

compelling in this case as in Lindsay.

is as

Chaffin has shown no

evidence linking Albertsons to the presence of the water on the
floor other than her observing a floor cleaning machine and a spot
of water.

The evidence which Chaffin did not refute is that the

floor cleaning machine did not leave any water behind.

If in fact

there was water on the floor as Chaffin alleges, the water could
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have arrived on the floor in several possible ways.

As the Utah

Supreme Court reiterated in Silcox;
The mere presence of a slippery spot on a floor does
not in and of itself establish negligence. This condition may arise in any place of business for any number
reasons. Proof that a slippery or wet substance was on
a floor, does not, without more, establish that defendant
knew or should have known of the condition.
Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624.
As in Lindsay, Chaffin has failed to satisfy her burden as to
how the water got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly
when it arrived there, or that the Albertsons had knowledge of its
presence. This evidence is insufficient for any jury to reasonably
infer that Albertsons created the condition.

A jury would engage

in mere speculation if allowed to determine whether Albertsons was
responsible for the water on the floor. Accordingly, Chaffin must
show that Albertsons had notice of the condition and a reasonable
opportunity to remove it.

This Chaffin has failed to do, and,

therefore, her claims were properly dismissed by the trial court
and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATELY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ALBERTSONS IN LIGHT OF THE STANDARDS FOR DECIDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions
establish there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
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that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co..
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980).

Subsection (e) of Rule 56 further

provides that in opposing a motion,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court set forth the following with
respect to the granting of summary judgment motions:
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves
for summary judgment . . . based on the lack of proof of
a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether
he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side or
the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict . . . .
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc. . 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see
Mavfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566 (directed verdict is appropriate in
negligence cases where there is an "absence of any substantial
evidence to support the verdict."); Mitchell. 697 P.2d 240 (Summary
judgment was appropriate because plaintiff failed in his burden to
show "that defendants' conduct was a substantial causative factor
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that led to Mitchell's death."). If the non-moving party cannot
muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on
his claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Anderson, 477

U.S. 242.
Application of this standard to the instant case shows that
the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of
Albertsons.

Albertsons has supported

its motion for summary

judgment with undisputed evidence that it did not have notice,
either actual or constructive, of the condition on the floor of
which Chaffin complains and that it did not create the condition.
Chaffin opposes the evidence presented by Albertsons by merely
citing to Chaffin1s deposition testimony that she observed a floor
cleaning machine before she fell and that there was a spot of water
on the floor.

This evidence is simply inadequate to overcome

Albertsons's motion.

A reasonable and fair-minded jury could not

find by a preponderance of the evidence that Chaffin is entitled to
a verdict against Albertsons.
Under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Chaffin1s response does not satisfy her burden of showing that
there is a genuine issue of a material fact remaining for trial.
Requiring Albertsons to prepare for and defend at trial would be a
gross waste of time and expense.
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The trial court did not err in

granting Albertsons' Motion for Summary Judgment and its Order
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the

foregoing, Defendant and Appellee,

Albertsons, Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial
court granting Albertsons1 Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed,
the appeal of Chaffin be dismissed, and Albertsons be awarded its
costs on appeal.
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1994.
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